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Abstract 
 
In December 2005 a new mission statement was released by the Air Force 
Leadership, “to deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America 
and its global interests...to fly and fight in Air, Space and Cyberspace.”  (Wynne & 
Mosley, 2005)  With the stand up of the AFCYBER command and the use of cyberspace 
to carry out our daily mission the USAF needs to have a clear understanding of what war 
in cyberspace looks like and what the laws are governing war in cyberspace.  This 
research and it’s resulting data analysis is intended to provide a better understanding of 
what the current laws of war are and how they translate to cyber war and the complexities 
that exist, along with recommendation on future revisions of the laws. 
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 WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ACT OF WAR IN CYBERSPACE? 
 
 
". . . attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of 
excellence.  Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of 
excellence." 
 
        Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
I.  Introduction 
 
Background 
In a background report from the Pentagon, December 1999, top pentagon officials 
stated that the United States was in a virtual war in cyberspace.  It stated that the United 
States of America was being “invaded,” every hour of every day, by hostile forces using 
computers.  (Randle, 1999)  Since this report, many researchers have stated that cyber 
warfare is tempting for our adversaries because our military forces are so over whelming 
it makes conventional attacks less likely.  Instead of fighting with high cost of fighter 
aircraft, tanks, or bombs, anyone with access to a computer and the internet can cause 
grave damage.   
In December 2005 a new mission statement was release by Air Force Leadership, 
“to deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its 
global interests…to fly and fight in Air, Space, and cyberspace.”  (Wynne & Mosley, 
2005)  The newest major command of the U.S. Air Force is the Air Force Cyberspace 
Command (AFCYBER) which is expected to be in full capability by October 2009.  
Major Gen William Lord will be the first commander and he summarizes the mission as: 
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 “The aim is to develop a major command that stands alongside Air Force Space 
Command and Air Force Combat Command as the provider of forces that the President, 
combatant commanders and the American people can rely on for preserving the freedom 
of access and commerce, in air, space and now cyberspace.” 
With this formal acknowledgement of cyberspace a domain in which the military 
can and will wage war it brings with it challenges and questions.  One of the biggest 
challenges of the new command will be clarifying or defining what is an act of war in 
cyberspace.   
Over the decades the way the U.S. militaries communicate and fight has changed 
drastically.  Relying more on computers and the infrastructure needed to carry out our 
day to day lives. (Wynne & Mosley, 2005)  Our nations critical infrastructure consists of 
the physical and cyber assets owned and operated by public and private companies that 
control our critical support structures (i.e. agriculture, food, water, public health, 
emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information and 
telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and 
hazardous material and postal and shipping to name a few).  As stated in the National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003, cyberspace is the nervous system of our 
country and our national security is depending on our ability to secure cyberspace.  
In spring of 2007, Estonia claimed to be under attack, not in the traditional sense 
by guns or bombs, but in the form of data request from more than a million computers.  
This attack overwhelmed the nation’s computer networks, crashing e-mail for its 
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 parliament, taking down emergency phone lines and freezing online services of 
government offices, banks, universities and hospitals.  Estonia accused Russia of 
conducting a “cyber war” in retaliation for a decision to move a Soviet-era war memorial.  
The Russian government denied involvement.  (Hollis, 2007)  However, 2 May 2007 
Estonia opened a criminal investigation under the Estonian Penal Code criminalizing 
computer sabotage and interference with the working of a computer network.  Estonia 
investigated the incident and was able to track the attack back to the Kremlin.  However, 
it is not known if the attack actually came from the building or if a zombie computer was 
used from this building.  They were unable to tell if the person who launched the attack 
was affiliated with the government or if they were a civilian acting on their own.   
As the world grows more dependent on computers, internet and cyberspace it is 
evident it is a pool of information that is constantly being updated, expanded and 
growing.  You can find anything on the internet, including how to build bombs, launch a 
denial of service attacks and basic hacker tutorials.  In March 2007, researchers at the 
Department of Energy’s Idaho National Laboratory conducted an experimental cyber 
attack and managed to make a generator self-destruct. (Hollis, 2007)  Computer attacks 
don’t just threaten other computers but the larger infrastructure that controls vital 
resources.  Viruses could become as dangerous as missiles.  At the same time, cyber 
attacks offer militaries the option of disabling an enemy’s vital infrastructure temporarily 
or completely destroying it.  (Hollis, 2007)  They are able to hinder their daily operations 
and perhaps stop further attacks without firing a traditional weapon. 
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 Research shows cyberspace is the new battleground.  The U.S. needs to learn 
when and how to deploy weapons against our enemy without physical battle if 
appropriate.  What are the rules of cyber war? (Hollis, 2007)  When should an act in 
cyber war translate and give just cause for actual physical war? 
Problem Statement 
Serious “interpretation” would have to take place in order to convert current laws, 
treaties, torts that would also fit into the cyberspace and cyber war.  An example, the 
U.N. Charter, “clearly prohibits states from using force except in self defense or with 
U.N. authorization.” (Hollis, 2007)  What does this mean for situations such as, the 
Estonia Russia computer attacks?  Is it only considered use of force if they would 
physically break into the parliament or other government building?  Even though the 
computer attack was not a traditional “physical” attack, they perpetrator did however, 
physically enter the computers of the parliament and cause damage.  In the absence of 
laws of war, then the exiting laws are construed to make them fit into more complex 
international and foreign laws.  Such as, if the hackers in the Estonia case were indeed 
identified as living in and launching the attack from Russia, but had no ties to the 
government or military.  Under existing rules, Estonia should have respond by asking 
Russia to police its own territory. (Hollis, 2007)  If Estonia would have launched an 
attack at Russian it would have breached Russia’s sovereignty.  As Duncan Hollis wrote 
in his article, E-war Rules of Engagement, nations could agree to waive sovereignty and 
permit a direct response in cyber attacks by terrorists that all nations might want.  
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 However, Estonia was able to track the attacker and arrested him.  He was and ethnic 
Russian living in Estonia.  Estonia is still investigating if the attacker was working alone 
or with a group. (Fox News, 2008) 
Based on the background provided, the following problem is addressed in this 
thesis:  What constitutes an Act of War in Cyberspace?  With the stand up of the 
AFCYBER command and the use of cyberspace in our daily mission the USAF needs to 
have a clear understanding of war in Cyberspace.  In the next few chapters the data will 
define cyberspace, information ware-fare, some actors, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), 
Geneva Convention, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), The Outer Space Treaty and 
what is missing from current laws.   Nations have devised rules of international law, such 
as the Geneva Convention, Laws of Armed Conflict, which seek to avoid war or 
minimize human suffering when conflicts occur.  As new technologies emerge, 
leadership needs to draft new rules by which to fight in cyber war.  So far, there have not 
been any changes to international law in order to govern attacks on or by computers and 
reason for this is that many feel current laws convey to cyberspace.  (Hollis, 2007) 
Limitations 
 The first limitation on this thesis was the lack of material and experts to draw 
from on the subject.  The concept of cyber war is not necessarily new.  Many scientists 
and top level leaders in the country and around the world have been envisioning the 
concept of cyber war for decades.  However, until recently, with the official stand up of 
the AFCYBER Command, cyber operations are new to the military are a work in 
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 progress, few decisions are complete.  Since experts in the field of cyber war are still 
undetermined, it was necessary to infer who the experts will likely be and what acts in 
cyber war are considered an act of war from documents, policy, international laws, 
treaties and other similar resources.   
 Another limitation for this thesis was the lack of official documentation on cyber 
war and what is considered an act of war and how the U.S. will respond.  There have 
been several cyber war attacks against the United States and other countries, but there’s 
no documentation on how to respond.  The number of articles and legal documentation 
on when to respond in self defense, attribution and to counter an attack are limited.      
Scope 
 Considering what is considered and act of war and the scope of cyber war are too 
expansive to discuss in one thesis.  For the purpose of this thesis the research used will 
look at cyberspace and the laws governing war in cyberspace.  Since the advent of 
cyberspace is new and fighting in cyberspace is relatively new, there have not been any 
new international laws, torts or treaties to convey to cyberspace.  The research for this 
thesis pertains to current laws and how they apply to cyber war.  Therefore, this research 
provides a foundation for further research and development of new cyber war laws.  
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 II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
 This chapter summarizes the literature reviewed to understand the research 
problem and support the proposed proposition.  First, this chapter provides background 
information that will enable the reader to understand key research concepts related to the 
complexity of cyber war and what constitutes an act of war in cyberspace.  This will be 
accomplished by defining what is considered cyberspace and what is considered an act of 
war in cyberspace and how information warfare fits in.  Next, a review of the Laws of 
Armed Conflict (LOAC), Geneva Convention, United Nations Charter, and the Outer 
Space Treaty and Telecommunications Act.  Along with defining theses laws they are 
followed by examples of ways they may be translated into cyber warfare.  This section 
provides the preponderance of data used for the content analysis.  Finally, as discussed in 
the Harvard Review article it is especially important to obtain attribution in cyber 
warfare.  Unlike traditional warfare, cyber warfare is much more difficult to establish 
who conducted the attack and their intent.  With attribution in a cyber attack it can be 
decided what laws apply, and how to proceed with a counter attack.  The laws that apply 
and how the U.S. responds to an attack is determined by who launched the attack and if 
they are working for a government or not.  The intent of this section is to provide some 
insight into how U.S. militaries may conduct counter attacks and how international laws 
apply.   Altogether these three sections will determine what cyber war is and how current 
laws translate or not. 
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 Defining Cyberspace 
 
Cyberspace 
 
Cyberspace is defined in the Air Force Core Concepts as a domain 
characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, 
and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.  
Cyberspace exists across the other physical domains of air, land, sea, and space and can 
facilitate contact between the cognitive processes and the physical domains. (8TH AFCC, 
2007)  In short, cyberspace exists when someone builds and operates networked 
electronic systems that send or receive data using electromagnetic energy. (8TH AFCC, 
2007)  With this in mind, there are adversaries that do not possess robust cyberspace 
capabilities but are able to challenge the United States using third party systems. They 
may use zombie computers, and this becomes an added consideration when responding to 
an attack.    
The breadth of cyberspace involves components that operate across all 
other domains to include internet protocol (IP) based terrestrial, airborne and space 
networks, non-IP based networks and data links, telephone networks, and control 
systems.  Electronic attack, directed energy and electronic protection are examples of 
capabilities that can be used to create effects in and through cyberspace.  (8TH AFCC, 
2007) 
War fighting in Cyberspace  
Currently, all the U.S. services and many national agencies maintain 
capabilities that use particular aspects of cyberspace to accomplish their specific missions.  
For example, intelligence organizations, which are collecting and analyzing data, use network 
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 capabilities to exploit the Global Information Grid and associated network infrastructures for 
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes. (8TH AFCC, 2007)  Force protection 
units use frequency jammers to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or high 
powered microwave (HPM) to control crowds in an urban environment. These types of 
operations represent different ways that cyberspace is used, but not how the domain itself is 
controlled.  (8TH AFCC, 2007) 
The war fighter’s first priority is to ensure friendly use of cyberspace while 
denying that same use to the adversary. (8TH AFCC, 2007)  A whole domain perspective 
also recognizes that cyber capabilities can be used to synchronize and integrate combat 
operations across the other domains. War fighting in cyberspace basically means countering 
our adversary capabilities through our attacks on his systems while defeating any attempts to 
counter our use of cyberspace.  This is an immense far reaching mission that goes far beyond 
networks, servers and personal computers. (8TH AFCC, 2007)  There are three categories of 
war fighting operations in cyberspace: ensuring operational freedom of action; delivering 
cross domain effects; and, supporting civil operations. (8TH AFCC, 2007) 
Information Warfare                        
The information age is here and it’s going to continue to grow.  The scope of 
information warfare has, embraces every aspect of information use that would permit war 
without battle. (Dicenso, 1999)  This includes human intelligence (HUMINT), electronic 
intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), psychological operations 
(PSYOP), and every other method of gathering and affecting information that may be 
used to the advantage of one nation or to the detriment of another during a conflict.  
(Dicenso, 1999)  On a daily basis, computers, software, e-mail and the world-wide web 
9 
 continue to have a dramatic impact on how the U.S. sees war and how they view what is 
considered war.  As discussed in the article by Mark Shulman, Air War College, the 
effect technology has had is to change not only the battlefield, how our militaries fight 
our adversaries, the actors and the types of targets selected, will ultimately, change the 
rules of military operations, as seen with the stand up of the Cyberspace Command.  
Advances in all technology, including military technology, have out-paced changes in the 
laws governing how the U.S. fights war in cyberspace. (Shulman, 1999) Over the past 
decade, the fastest developing type of "armed conflict" is IW.  Ironically, IW is neither 
“armed,” nor does it necessarily involve “conflict.” (Shulman, 1999)  For instance, 
Special Forces detonate a small non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapon near a nation's 
central bank computer storage facility, destroying the electronic systems that transact, 
communicate, and archive the nation's financial information.  What if, communication 
specialists tapped into another state's television broadcast "morphed" images of that 
state's religious leader engaged in sacrilegious acts?  Or, another communications 
specialist hacks into a target nation's computer network coordinating air or rail traffic to 
reprogram the systems to shut down without warning. (Shulman, 1999)  Each of these 
hypothetical examples would cause severe damage to the nations involved: economies 
could be destroyed; governments would fall; planes and trains crash.  Thousands of 
people would perish. As dramatic as these hypothetical’s are, they demonstrate how 
complicated IW is and just how devastating it can be.  (Shulman, 1999)  What makes it 
even more complicated is that if done correctly, the attacks go undetected.    
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 The Air Force appears to be the lead agency in studying IW, for the purpose of 
this thesis their definition will be used: IW is any "action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or 
destroy the enemy's information and its functions; protecting ourselves against those 
actions; and exploiting our own military information functions. (8TH AFCC, 2007)  It 
includes electronic warfare, military deception, physical destruction, security measures, 
and information attack.  (8TH AFCC, 2007)  The Air Force defines information as "data 
and instructions" and distinguishes IW from warfare in the information age as attempts to 
influence information directly.   
 
Defining Laws and how they translates to cyber war 
 
Laws of Armed Conflict 
 
The LOAC exists from a desire between civilized nations to prevent unnecessary 
suffering and destruction, while keeping the effective of waging war.  LOAC is part of 
international law, and regulates the conduct of armed conflict.  Its main purpose is to 
protect civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked.  LOAC applies to 
international armed conflicts and in the conduct of military operations and related 
activities in armed conflict. (Powers, 2006)  Also, closely associated with LOAC is the 
Hague Convention on Land Warfare and requires that all necessary steps must be taken to 
spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, 
historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, 
provided that they are not being used at the time for military purposes. (Hague Convention, 
1954)  Therefore, since LOAC covers the laws of  war, the Hague Convention covers aspects 
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 regarding protection of marked buildings then it is easy to recognized how these two laws 
correspond to one another. 
There are currently four important LOAC principles governing armed conflict—
military necessity, distinction, proportionality and chivalry.  
Military Necessity.  Military necessity is what it sounds like.  It requires military 
forces to engage only in those acts necessary to accomplish a legitimate military 
objective.  Attacks are limited strictly to military objectives.  In applying military 
necessity to targeting, the rule generally means the U.S. military may target those 
facilities, equipment, and forces which, if destroyed, would lead as quickly as possible to 
the enemy’s submission.  (Brown, 2006)  
Military necessity also applies to weapons review. AFI 51-402, Weapons Review, 
requires the Air Force to perform a legal review of all weapons and weapons systems 
intended to meet a military requirement. These reviews ensure the U.S. complies with its 
international obligations relating to LOAC, and it helps military planners ensure military 
personnel do not use weapons or weapons systems that violate international law.  Some 
examples of illegal arms for combat include poison weapons and expanding hollow point 
bullets.  (Brown, 2006)  
Distinction.  Distinction is basically discriminating between lawful combatant 
targets and noncombatant targets, such as, civilians, civilian property, POWs, and 
wounded personnel out of combat.  Distinction means military missions, only engage 
valid military targets.  An indiscriminate attack is one that strikes military objectives and 
12 
 civilians or civilian objects without distinction. Distinction requires defenders to separate 
military objects from civilian objects to the maximum extent feasible.  Therefore, it 
would be inappropriate to locate a hospital or POW camp next to an ammunition factory.  
(Brown, 2006) 
Proportionality.  Proportionality prohibits the use of any kind or degree of force 
that exceeds that needed to accomplish the military objective.  Proportionality compares 
the military advantage gained to the harm inflicted while gaining this advantage.  
Proportionality requires a balance between a direct military advantage anticipated by 
attacking a legitimate military target and the expected incidental civilian injury or 
damage.  Proportionality seeks to prevent an attack in situations where civilian casualties 
would clearly outweigh any military gains.  This principle encourages combat forces to 
minimize collateral damage.  (Brown, 2006)  
Geneva Convention 
 The Geneva Convention of 1949 was basically derived from instances that 
occurred during the two World Wars and it is the base of the current LOAC.   The 
Geneva Convention consists of four treaties that set the standard for international law for 
humanitarian concerns.  The main concern is the treatment of non-combatants and 
prisoners of war.  They do not affect the use of weapons in war, which are covered by 
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Protocol on the use of gas and 
biological weapons of 1925.  The first convention was signed in Geneva Switzerland in 
1864 and it covered the sick and wounded in war and it was expanded on in 1906.  Two 
13 
 more conventions covering the wounded and prisoners of war were signed in 1929.  
Again, in 1949 four new conventions were signed, the primary one being the treatment of 
civilians during wartime.  (World Almanac and Book of Facts, 2008)  The treatment of 
civilian’s convention of 1949 provided safeguards for wounded civilians, children under 
15 years of age, pregnant women, and the elderly.  It also forbids the use of 
discrimination based on racial, religious, national or political grounds.  This same 
convention also specifies torture, collective punishment, reprisals, unwarranted 
destruction of property, and that the civilians cannot be used by the armed forces while 
captive.  Civilians are to be treated humanely, fed adequately and have access to supplies 
needed and are not to be forced to disclose more information than what is common 
knowledge.  (World Almanac and Book of Facts, 2008)    
 
Cyber warfare is making it difficult to distinguish between military and civilian 
targets since ninety percent of the United States current infrastructure is privately owned 
and operated.  (Brown, 2006)  This being the case it blurs the line and makes it even more 
difficult to distinguishing legitimate targets within our critical infrastructure.  The 1977 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions established the "Basic Rule" on discrimination 
which is more difficult to apply to cyber war.  (Shulman, 1999)  In order to ensure 
respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, conflicts have to 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and also between civilian 
objects and military objectives and only direct operations toward the military objectives.  
(Shulman, 1999)  
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 Article 51 protects civilian populations and defines unlawfully indiscriminate 
attacks: (a) Not directed at a specific military objective; (b) which cannot be directed to a 
specific military objective; or (c) which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; 
and in each case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians without 
distinction.  (Shulman, 1999) 
Traditional tools for distinguishing civilian from military personnel are not as 
black and whit as they were before long-range bombardment and telecommunications.  
Traditionally for combatants wore uniforms that visibly distinguished them from 
noncombatants.  Likewise, most warfare involved physical proximity.  No matter what 
the weapon, a sword or a projectile, most combatants could see each other and distinguish 
combatants from noncombatants.  One exception was aerial bombardment by airplane or 
missile.  Even then however, airmen doing the targeting still had to make realistic 
distinctions.  With Cyber war it is inconsequential whether they are wearing military 
uniforms or not.  For example, someone launching a computer virus to attack an 
American military communications system may be sitting in a basement of a public 
building wearing a doctor scrubs or a clergy robe.  Instead of a military uniform, he 
would be wearing the symbol of the medic or clergy, which by traditional warfare are 
protected.  He could be part of a protected group sitting in a privately-owned building.  
This example shows how cyber war may not be a physical proximity to distinguishing 
combatants from non-combatants.  Therefore, in regards to causing damage and 
destruction of a vital computer or LAN this individual could be seen as a combatant and 
subject to proportional response.  (Shulman, 1999)  
15 
 The USAF believes the correct formula for an attack must be likely to produce a 
military advantage that outweighs civilian casualties and damage.  (Shulman, 1999)
 
  In order 
to do this the USAF must weigh the importance of navigation systems, communications 
systems, and electrical grid systems to the opponent's military effort.  Should the advantage 
be measured in lives saved or lost; dollars spared saved, risked; or only in permanent physical 
destruction?   IW affords us opportunities that traditional conventional weapons do not; 
degrading a system could be reversible in ways that physical destruction could not.  This 
translates to lives saved whereas systems become inoperative either permanently or briefly.  
Does this therefore mean that reversible attacks will be launched against civilians or civilian 
infrastructure more freely?  Maybe. Does it strengthen adherence to the norms of 
discrimination?  If the goal is to protect civilian lifestyles as much as possible during the 
operation, then the answer is "no." If the aim is to contain war's destructiveness and to 
facilitate restoration of civil society after the conflict, then the answer is "quite probably yes."  
(Shulman, 1999)   
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
  As defined by the Department of Defense Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) are weapons that are very capable of high destruction and of being used to 
destroy a large number of people.  Generally WMDs are high damage causing explosives 
or nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons.   (DTIC, 2008) 
  AF Handbook 10-2502, USAF Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat 
Planning and Response handbook, states terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons 
within the United States is a Federal offense under Title 18. U.S. Code (USC) Section 
175 for biological weapons possession and Section 229 for chemical or biological 
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 weapons use as a WMD.  (AFH 10-2502, 2001)  Even when conducted overseas, any 
property owned, leased or used by any US agency or department, having a chemical or 
biological weapons attack is a Federal offense, Title 18 USC, Section 229(4).   
  AF Handbook 10-2502, USAF Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat 
Planning and Response handbook, also covers the use of WMD during wartime between 
nations.  It sates that the use of chemical or biological weapons from on nation to against 
another nation is a clear violation of LOAC.   
  Per DoDD 5100.77, paragraph 5.6, the U.S. Army is the DoD Executive 
Agent for LOAC violation issues and they are responsible for performing investigations 
pertaining to chemical and biological weapons.   
However, none of the directives listed above, nor LOAC defines a WMD in 
cyberspace.  My research however, introduced WMD in cyberspace and requires 
attention.  Some examples WMD in cyberspace are, if an attacker where to target a dam 
and open up the flood gates electronically.  This could cause a massive amount of deaths 
depending on what dam they were to attack.  Or, if an attacker were to use cyberspace to 
hack into a power grid and take out power to a large area of the U.S.  An attack of this 
type would affect everything from electricity, to transportation and medical facilities.  An 
attack of this magnitude could cause thousands of deaths, not to mention injuries and 
trauma.  Examples like these have been used in sci-fi books and movies since the 1970’s, 
but have not been look at seriously lawmakers that affect LOAC, U.N. Charter and other 
international laws.  Currently, attacks by terrorist or terrorist groups are considered a 
criminal act in the country from which it occurred but does not fall under a LOAC 
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 violation.  Therefore, if an attack was carried out from a foreign country the U.S. would 
have no recourse at this time unless the hosting country would be willing to prosecute the 
accused.   
The Outer Space Treaty 
  It was not very long ago, when thoughts of preserving space for peaceful 
purposes began at the United Nations in the 1950’s.  In 1957 the U.S. and its allies 
submitted their proposals for how the treaty should look for reserving space exclusively 
for “peaceful and scientific purposes,” (Ruseck, 2003) but the Soviet Union rejected all 
proposals based on their preparation to launch the world’s first satellite and in order to 
test its first intercontinental ballistic missile. 
  The U.N. resolution of 1884 called on countries to refrain from stationing 
WMDs in outer space.  U.N. resolution 1962 set legal principles on outer space 
exploration, stipulating that all countries have the right to explore space.  In 1963, these 
two resolutions became the framework for the Outer Space Treaty.  The U.S. and the 
Soviet Union submitted two separate proposals in 1966.  After review both, they came up 
with a mutually agreed proposal and it was agreed upon and approved on December 19, 
1966 and was signed and approved by all parties and entered into force October 10, 1967. 
(Ruseck, 2003) 
  Basically the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 bans stationing WMDs in outer 
space, spells out the legally binding rules of space exploration, and prohibits military 
activities on celestial bodies.  Ninety-seven countries are part of the treaty; North Korea 
is the only state with real potential for space-launch capabilities that has not signed the 
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 treaty.  Many countries seem to be concerned with the U.S. missile defense plans and 
space policy.  China has proposed a disarmament agreement in Geneva in the hopes to 
negotiate a treaty in order to prevent and arms race in outer space.  The U.S. insists there 
is no need for the treaty, because at this time there is not an arms race for outer space.   
  The basic treaty terms forbid countries from deploying “nuclear weapons 
or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction” in outer space.  In the treaty the 
definition of WMD is not spelled out, but is to be commonly understood as nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons.    One thing the treaty doesn’t address is the launching 
of ballistic missiles, which could be armed with nuclear warheads through space.  The 
treaty emphasizes that space is used for peaceful purposes which could be interpreted as 
all weapons through space.   
The treaty’s key arms control provisions are in Article IV, parties commit not to: 
- Place in orbit around the Earth or other celestial bodies any nuclear     
      weapons or objects carrying WMD 
- Install WMD on celestial bodies or station WMD in outer space in any  
other manner  
- Establish military bases or installations, test “any type of weapons,” or  
conduct military exercises on the moon and other celestial bodies other 
treaty provisions underscore that space is no single country’s domain 
and that all countries have a right to explore it.  
These provisions state that:  
- Space should be accessible to all countries and can be 
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 - Space and celestial bodies are exempt from national claims of ownership  
- Countries are to avoid contaminating and harming space or celestial  
    bodies  
- Countries exploring space are responsible and liable for any damage they  
   cause  
 - Space exploration is to be guided by “principles of cooperation and  
    mutual assistance,” such as obliging astronauts to provide aid to one  
    another if needed (Ruseck, 2003) 
 As stated above, the Outer Space Treaty prohibits nations from stationing WMD 
on a celestial body.  However, it does not cover weapons moving through outer space, 
such as, Nuclear weapons on a missile.  It addresses space as a peaceful place.  There are 
currently satellites in space that aid in our daily lives, such as, telecommunications and 
global positioning systems (GPS).  It could be argued, that if an attacker were to target a 
satellite it could be used as a WMD.  For example, if an attacker were to shut off a 
satellite that controls GPS.  With the amount of airlines, military operations and 
transportation systems world-wide that would be affected by this could be catastrophic.  
Again, a weapon of mass destruction is not really defined, other than traditional thinking 
of chemical, biological weapons.  However, as the name states, Weapon of “Mass” 
Destruction, how many lives is considered “Mass.”  Current laws do not define how 
many people have to be killed, injured or affected by an attack to be a WMD.   
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 International Maritime Satellite  
 International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) as stated in AMC Instruction 33-
109, International Maritime Satellite Management, is a commercial comm. System 
subject to international law and treaty.  It is a radio comm. device using a satellite link to 
interface with terrestrial telephone systems or other mobile terminals.  Terminals are 
commissioned as land, air or sea terminal.  Once commissioned, the terminals may be 
used only in the configuration stated in the commissioning application.  (DiCenso, 1999) 
 There are 79 countries on the international INMARSAT treaty.  One of the 
provisions of the treaty is that it may only be used for administrative, humanitarian and 
peacetime applications or under the auspices of the United States.  The system may not 
be used for making war or for example it cannot be used to direct air strikes etc.  
(DiCenso, 1999) 
 Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and Defense Information 
Technology Contracting Organization (DITCO) consider INMARSAT long-haul 
telecommunications systems per Department of Defense Instruction 46410-14, Base and 
Long-Haul Telecommunications Equipment and Services.  (DiCenso, 1999) 
 
Attribution 
 
Actors 
 
The United States has routinely conducted surveillance flights over China in order 
to gain electronic and visual intelligence.  The Chinese government was aware of it and 
began sending jet fighters to accompany, our reconnaissance planes.  On 1 April 2001 an 
American surveillance plane collided with a Chinese fighter about seventy miles off the 
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 coast of China.  The American plane had to make an emergency landing in China.  The 
Chinese jet spun out of control and was lost at sea killing the pilot Wang Wei.  
(Creekman, 2002) 
 Both countries blamed each other for the incident. (Creekman, 2002) Word 
spread, and some American citizens were angry over the accusations China was making.  
Armed with the internet, they stated trash talking over the internet and they managed to 
deface and vandalize at least sixty-five Chinese websites. (Creekman, 2002) 
 In retaliation, a group of Chinese hackers, calling themselves the “Hackers Union 
of China,” declared war on America. (Creekman, 2002)  The Hackers Union of China 
declared the week of 1 – 7 May 2001 as “Hack the USA” week they took credit for 
shutting down or altering multiple U.S. government websites, including the websites for 
the Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives and the White 
House.  The hackers replaced the content of one site with China’s fluttering red flag and 
rendition of the Chinese national anthem that automatically played whenever users 
accessed the site.  (Creekman, 2002)  Hackers replaced other sites with tributes to 
downed Chinese pilot, Wang Wei or plastered the sites with messages such as “Beat 
down Imperialism of American” and other anti-American, pro-Chinese sentiments.  The 
hackers ended their war after claiming to have hacked one thousand American websites.  
However, it has been speculated, that the Chinese government was actually responsible 
for the attack not just a renegade hacker club.  (Green, 2002) 
Computer hacking is becoming more widespread and does not entail the person 
having a degree in computer engineering or computer science.  Anyone with access to a 
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 computer and the internet can find step-by-step hacking tutorials and can begin when and 
where they like.  Hacking into another computer is considered trespassing in the United 
States and carries its own punishments under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA); most experts are more worried about the damage the hacker can cause after 
gaining access, rather than the hack itself.  (Creekman, 2002) 
Hackers – Non-vital target 
If a citizen of another nation where to become a hacker and spread a virus that would 
erase all files on an infected computer, and that virus were to spread throughout the US, 
infecting fifty percent of the nation’s personal computers, believe it or not there are not very 
many if any legal recourses available to the victims.  If this same hacker was an American 
citizen-hacker and spread the same virus throughout the U.S. it would be near impossible to 
prosecute.  But if this hacker is from another country and there was not an extradition treaty 
with that country then the odds of this hacker finding his way into a U.S. court room would 
be even more astronomical.   
The most difficult tasks would be to bring a citizen hacker from another nation to the 
U.S. to face trial.  In an earlier case, factor v. Laubenheimer, the Supreme Court held that the 
legal right for a country to demand extradition of another country’s citizen exists only when 
it is created by treaty.  (Creekman, 2002)  Because the U.S. does not usually enter into 
treaties with countries, there is no extradition treaty with other nations, and thus, no legal 
ground to demand the extradition of a citizen hacker to face an American judge.  The U.S. 
could conceivably ask for extradition absent a treaty, the U.S. inability to comply with the 
reciprocity for which the other nation would undoubtedly ask, would probably mean the other 
nation would deny the request.  (Creekman, 2002) 
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 Another possible way to bring a citizen hacker to justice in the U.S. is through 
extralegal seizure.  In U.S. v. Alverez-Machain, the Supreme Court held that a federal court 
did not lose jurisdiction over a suspect because that suspect had been abducted from Mexico 
and brought to the U.S. for trial without resorting to the extradition treaty between the U.S. 
and Mexico.  Thus, U.S. officers, private individuals, law enforcement officers, or military 
units could mount an operation to abduct the hacker from the other nation in order to bring 
him to justice in the U.S.  While this approach is a legal option, the international and 
diplomatic ramifications of an extralegal seizure would be so dramatic and would enter into 
another realm of military battle.   
So, the U.S. could basically kidnap the citizen hacker, or hope that he can be 
convicted in his host country.  Since the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty they can 
request the hacker be convicted in their host country, nothing will be awarded to the victims, 
but they will stand trial.  However, a conviction will only take place in the host nation’s 
courts if the hacker’s virus spread to those nations computers also.  (Creekman, 2002)  An 
example of a nation updating computer crime laws is, The People’s Republic of China that 
added computer crimes to the PRC Criminal Code in 1994, making it a crime to delete, alter 
or disturb the operation of a computer information system so that it does not operate properly.  
A serious offense is punishable by up to five years in prison and an “exceptionally serious” 
offense is punishable by no less than five years.  In addition, the Chinese government 
proscribed the deletion of, alteration of, or addition to programs installed in, or processed in 
transmitted by, a computer system.  Unfortunately, the U.S. cannot force the Chinese to 
prosecute the hacker, nor can it force an extradition of the citizen.  Thus, while the U.S. and 
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 China both have relevant laws, but just because the laws exist doesn’t mean the laws are 
used.   
Hacker - Vital Target 
 
The U.S. has its hands tied again in its available responses for justice if another 
nation’s citizen hacker were to cripple any of the U.S. critical infrastructures.  The affects of 
such an attack could be catastrophic, and the U.S. is largely paralyzed in its response because 
the hacker is a private citizen, therefore, making it law enforcement issue.  As such, the 
absence of an extradition treaty significantly limits the retributive responses available to the 
U.S. government and the victims.  (Creekman, 2007) 
Regardless of the vital target or the damage that occurs, if a computer attack is 
attributable to a private citizen with no connection or sponsorship by any government, then 
the attack must be considered a criminal matter.  Like a computer attack on a non-vital U.S. 
target by an American citizen hacker, an attack on a vital U.S. target would be controlled by 
the CFAA. (Creekman, 2002)  The statute specifically deals with computer related threats to 
national security.  In addition, the statute prohibits the causation of damage throughout the 
spread of computer viruses or other programs.  The same frustrations accompanying the 
attempted prosecution of a citizen hacker of a non-vital computer system would also, 
unfortunately accompany any attempt to prosecute a citizen hacking a vital U.S. target.  It 
would be quite difficult to prosecute the hacker because of the absence of an extradition 
treaty with the other nation.  (Creekman, 2002)  
Even if there was an extradition treaty between country and the U.S., it is doubtful 
that an extradition would occur.  Most extradition treaties include a political offense 
exception, which stipulates that a requested party will not grant extradition if the offense is 
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 considered a political offense or connected to a political offense.  The nation may view the 
actions of its citizen hacker as a critique of the American democratic government and 
therefore, consider it a political offense, absolving the host nation’s government of any 
responsibility to extradite the citizen hacker.  (Creekman, 2002) 
If an attack caused considerable damage, such as a plan crash resulting from a 
failure in the air traffic control system, the U.S. could categorize it as a terrorist attack.  The 
international pressure to extradite a terrorist far exceeds any pressure to extradite common 
criminals. (Creekman, 2002)  This increased pressure is due in large part to the perception 
that the state refusing the extradition request encouraged the terrorist attack.  In this case, the 
host country will want to avoid implication because the complete refusal of a state to 
cooperate in the suppression of such a hostile act could be considered state sponsorship.  This 
in turn, would invoke the law of conflict management, which authorizes the use of force in 
self-defense.   (Creekman, 2002) 
Defensive Counter cyber  
The objective of Defensive Counter cyber (DCC) is to protect friendly 
forces and vital interests from adversary cyber attack.  (8TH AFCC, 2007) DCC consists 
of active and passive cyber defense operations including all defensive measures designed 
to destroy attacking adversary forces or reduce their effectiveness. Cyber defense 
includes measures to preserve, protect, recover, and reconstitute friendly cyber 
capabilities before, during, and after an adversary attack. Currently, cyber defense 
operations are limited to electronic protection (EP) and network defense (NetD), but 
should also extend to other terrestrial, airborne, and space based systems that are a part of 
cyberspace. (8TH AFCC, 2007) 
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 Offensive Counter cyber    
Offensive Counter cyber (OCC) operations deny, degrade, disrupt, 
destroy, or deceive an adversary’s cyber capability.  (8TH AFCC, 2007)  Adversary 
cyber capabilities include electronics, networks, and other systems that use the EMS.  
OCC targets include adversary terrestrial, airborne, and space networks; electronic attack 
(EA) and network attack (NetA) systems; and, command, control, communication, 
computers, and intelligence (C4I) nodes. As an adversary becomes more dependent on 
cyberspace, OCC operations have the potential to produce effects that hinder their ability 
to effectively organize, coordinate, and orchestrate a military campaign. (8TH AFCC, 
2007) 
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 III. Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 The premise of this chapter is to explain how research was conducted for this 
thesis.  For the purpose of this research, a literature review and content analysis was 
conducted.  Since the concept of cyberspace and initiating war within it is a new concept 
two methods were chosen in which to analysis information on the subject and determine 
what the core concepts are. 
The first method used in this thesis was the literature review.  As with all theses 
the literature review is an important chapter.  In this chapter key terms are defined based 
on your research and identify what are important contributing factors.  In this thesis, it 
was important to highlight these terms because they are key terms that reoccurred in the 
literature that was found on the subject.  Even though the concept of cyberspace has been 
written about for decades, how it translates to war has been inconceivable since 
cyberspace is space and not a physical realm.  Unlike, physical wars of the past, war 
fighting in the future will be drastically different.  It is important to define terms and 
determine what common attributes are and how they translate to cyber war.      
Content Analysis 
 A content analysis is a research tool used to review articles, books, and interviews 
to determine how often certain words or concepts appear.  Busch et al., 2005)  By using 
this method for the purpose of this thesis it was possible to determine common themes or 
areas that need attention as it pertains to cyberspace and war in cyberspace. 
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  For the purpose of this research a conceptual analysis was conducted using Busch 
et al. and the eight steps for conceptual content analysis.  This was the framework, 
however, the actual analysis used was a combination of the Busch et al. all concept and 
the Thomas theme, coding and comparison concept analysis.  Below are the steps 
described by Busch et al. with a definition of how the step was used for the purpose of 
this thesis and how it was applied with the Thomas concept analysis for textual themes.  
Below is the methodology for this research:   
1. Decide the level of analysis. 
                  For the purpose of this research an analysis of certain words was conducted.  
This research used 33 relevant articles, publications, instructions, and on-line sources to 
conduct this analysis.   
2. Decide how many concepts to code for. 
                  It was recommended by Busch et al. to recognize the key words or phases the 
researchers are looking for before beginning reading.  By combining this concept with the 
Thomas’ themed base approach.  (Thomas, 2003)  By doing this I was able to evaluate 
each document and determine the “theme” and was able to categorize the concepts. 
3. Decide whether to code for existence or frequency of a concept. 
                  Per Busch et al., the coding frequency means that every time a word or phrase 
is used, it is counted.  Coding for existence, means that once a work or phrase is used it is 
noted and thee is and it is not counted by how many times it appears in a document.  
Thomas’ contends that each document has a theme and the content can be categorized by 
theme in order to define the common theme among the research documents.  For the 
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 purpose of this research each theme was document and manually tallied based on how 
many documents included this theme in their reading.  The researcher needs to decide on 
how to distinguish among concepts.    
4. Develop rules for coding your texts. 
This research differed in that instead of coding the test it was based on 
common themes or categories of information.  Once all the documents were 
analyzed for its theme, then that theme or several themes where tallied for that 
document.   
` 6.  Decide to do with the irrelevant information. 
       For the purpose of this research any irrelevant information was not used.     
7.  Code the texts. 
             For this research all tallying was conducted manually.  This method has its 
pros and cons.  A pro is that each article is reviewed thoroughly and it allows for the 
researcher to determine independent themes.  A negative is that is done manually, this 
leaves it open to human error.  Another, con was the researcher was the sole coder and 
therefore, it left the data open to the researchers bias’. 
 8.  Analyze your Results. 
      Based on the guidelines provided by Busch et al., the researcher is to examine 
the data and attempt to draw a conclusion about the data.  For this analysis it was visually 
easier to demonstrate the themes and their analysis with frequency tables.  Each table 
gives the frequency the theme occurred in the literature with the relevant information 
collected and a brief conclusion to explain the date and how it pertains to cyber war.        
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 “It seems one has to accept as inevitable that when something useful for the 
improvement of man’s life has been invented, thoughts will either turn into how to 
weaponize or destroy it, or, in the case of computer network technology, both.” 
  
                                                                                 Louise Doswald-Beck 
IV. Analysis and Results 
 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the findings of information analysis in 
the literature review and the content analysis.  By analyzing the data, the results will 
answer my thesis question: What constitutes an act of war in cyberspace.  The basis for 
the literature review was to determine how traditional laws of war translate to cyber war 
and what the attributes of war look like in cyber war.  The information revolution based on 
electronic communications, computers, software and the creation of a world-wide web has 
had a huge and long running impact on how the USAF fights wars.  These technologies have 
not only changed the way war fighters think of war, but the players have changed, the 
battlefield and the types of targets as well.  With the emergence of the Air Force Cyber 
Command it has also changed the rules governing military operations and is now recognized 
by the military as a “real” force.  Advances in military technology have out-paced changes in 
the law of armed conflict and international laws governing how war is conducted.  This 
research focuses on the development of a new type of military and the challenges it poses for 
the legal regimes that constrain warfare. 
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 Literature Review Analysis 
Traditional War vs. Cyber War 
       In order to compare how traditional war was waged and how it pertains to 
cyber war, an extensive literature review on cyber war articles was conducted on, Air 
Force doctrine, LOAC, Geneva Convention, WMD and The Outer Space Treaty.  In a 
traditional sense, war was waged by a formal declaration of war issued by a government 
indicating that a state of war exists between those nations.  Basically, a declaration of war 
was used to regulate the conduct between military forces during military engagements of 
the respective countries.  The United Nations Charter was created as an attempted to 
commit the nations involved to using warfare only for defensive purposes.  In 1959 
however, North Korea invaded South Korea and the United Nations Security Council did 
not agree with the North Korean action and asked its members to come to the aid of 
South Korea.  Therefore, after World War II Congress limited its use of the power to 
declare war to issuing “authorization of force.”  Not using the word “war” is more public 
relations friendly and by not “declaring war” loosens the constraints for the laws of war.  
This research revealed that this is where the term “use of force” came from and why it is 
currently used in times of war. 
      The international rules governing the “use of force” as stated by the United 
Nations are Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, prohibits any nation form using 
force against another.  The charter allows for only two exceptions to this rule:  when 
force is required in self-defense (Article 15) or when the Security Council authorizes the 
use of force to protect international peace and security.  (Taylor, 2008)  
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  Moving on to today’s force, according to the Eighth Air Force Concept of 
Cyber Warfare Plan, 2007, all military forces and all national agencies maintain capabilities 
that use particular aspects of cyberspace to accomplish their specific missions.  Today’s war 
fighter’s first priority is to ensure friendly use of cyberspace as described by the Eighth Air 
Force Concept of Cyber Warfare Plan.  With the use of cyberspace the USAF is able to 
integrate combat operations across other domains. War fighting in cyberspace is basically a 
means to countering our adversary’s capabilities through our attacks on his systems while 
defeating any attempts to counter our use of cyberspace.  Cyber space is everywhere making 
it an immense far reaching mission area and going far beyond networks.   
Laws Governing War 
Laws of Armed Conflict 
 One the greatest challenges of law, is keeping up with the changes of and 
advancement in technology.  This research has uncovered as many questions as it has 
answered.  Such as, when thinking of law and how it applies to technology militaries 
don’t necessarily think of a physical battlefields and how these laws translate into a 
cyberspace battlefield.  In reference to this research and how LOAC apply, most do seem 
to loosely convey to cyberspace.  Below are the four basic principles of LOAC and an 
example of how it may translate to cyber war.    
 1.  Necessity:  Only us the degree of force required in order to defeat the enemy is 
permitted.  In addition, attacks must be limited to military objectives whose nature, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and offers a definite 
military advantage.  (Brown, 2006) 
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  Necessity in cyberspace: 
 Throughout the literature review different authors gave different scenarios of this 
principle as it applies to information attacks, attacks on most of the enemy's military 
computer systems are permitted.  However, as Brown states in his article if the attacks are 
aimed at the enemy’s stock market or financial systems it seems that would not justify 
military necessity because this attack would not be seen as a military advantage. 
In my research it is also clear that cyber attacks intended to cause widespread 
environmental damage also are not permitted under the principle of military necessity.  
One example that Brown used is how information attacks aimed toward the enemy's 
oil/fuel supplies is seen as a military advantage, but the attacks must be careful to avoid 
widespread environmental damage such as, the oil well fires set by Iraq in Kuwait at the 
end of the Gulf War.  Another example can be applied to technological attacks by using 
cyberspace attack a dam and release flood waters.  This is permitted if it the action 
doesn’t adversely affect civilian population. 
Under LOAC, militaries may not target noncombatants, and may not terrorize 
them with threats of attack.  Although no specific weapons are mentioned in the rules of 
international law prohibiting direct attacks on noncombatants, it is understood among the 
armed forces that the rules are meant to govern the physical damage on targets.  If 
traditional and cyber weapons are capable of causing physical damage, then it would 
make sense that LOAC should make no distinction between them and it should therefore 
cover cyber war where it applies.  Even though one of the benefits of cyber war is the 
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 ability to reduce collateral damage and reconstruction cost.  It should fall under the 
blanket of LOAC because the possibility of physical destruction is very possible. 
Another military target that is seen as an advantage is the destruction of bridges, 
railroads, communications centers, and fuel supplies, and such facilities are justified as 
lawful targets if they are part of the infrastructure used by the military or are necessary 
for military mobilization.  However, in many cases, these facilities (especially 
communications centers) support both military and civilian infrastructure.  For example, 
ninety-five percent of communications traffic of the U.S. Defense Information Systems 
Agency, the lead defense agency operating communications and computer systems 
serving the entire Department of Defense (DoD), travels on civilian lines available to the 
public. (Johnson, 1995)  The lawfulness of any attack on such dual-use facilities will turn 
on whether the military advantage gained by attacking the target outweighs the adverse 
effect on civilians and the civilian population.  This principle should apply to attacking 
infrastructural targets by information attack as well.  (DiCenso, 1999) 
 2.  Distinction:  requires distinguishing military objectives from protected 
civilian objectives such as places of worship, schools, hospitals and dwellings. (Brown, 
2006) 
 Distinction in cyberspace: 
A lawful combatant during military battle has the right to kill enemy forces or drop a 
bomb or fire on a legitimate military target, but they are not authorized to kill an unarmed 
civilian.  Lawful combatants include the uniformed armed forces of a state (except 
medical personnel and chaplains) and any forces that satisfy all of the following four 
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 conditions: (1) They are commanded by a person held responsible for his subordinates; 
(2) they wear a fixed emblem; (3) they carry their arms openly; and (4) they conduct their 
operations in accordance with LOAC and other customary international laws.  (Brown, 
2006)  Civilians that accompany our armed forces into combat are covered under the 
Geneva Convention and are to be treated as prisoners of war as the armed forces 
members themselves.  However, nothing in the Geneva Conventions or other sources of 
international law, grants them the legal right to engage the enemy.  Many civilian 
employees and contract personnel accompanying the armed forces are there supporting 
the services in areas such as logistics and communications via cyberspace and they are 
authorized to defend against information attacks, but should be prohibited from engaging 
in information attacks themselves. That function should lie exclusively with the armed 
forces, who are lawful combatants.  (DiCenso, 1999) 
Additionally, LOAC gives protected status to units using distinctive emblem 
medical units, religious establishments, and specially marked cultural property.  
Conventional attacks on these sites or areas are prohibited, similarly, information attacks 
on the computer systems of these protected sites should be treated the same.  (Brown, 
2006)  However, on occasion the protected status of a site may conflict with the right to 
engage legitimate targets.  Traditionally, if a state uses a protected or civilian site in order 
to shield a legitimate target (i.e. such as putting a command post under a hospital or 
parking fighter aircraft next to a cultural shrine), then the protected site loses its 
protection and it may be attacked in order to destroy the military target.  (Brown, 2006)  
This translates to cyber attacks by the military on military computer systems, (i.e. 
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 malicious code) that also house protected sites then the protected systems lose their 
protection.  Just as it is possible to use protected sites as shields against bombs, it is also 
possible to use protected servers as shields against malicious code.  States should be 
required to separate computer systems with a protected status from those without one. 
States also should be specifically prohibited from embedding systems that lawful military 
target in infrastructure that is not protected.  
An analogy drawn to computer viruses, all unprotected computer systems are 
open target to computer viruses, without distinction between combatant and 
noncombatant systems.  An attack on enemy military computer systems using malicious 
code cannot be considered unlawful per se. However, malicious code such as viruses, 
worms, Trojan horses, logic bombs, and trap doors, also infect systems used by civilians 
as well as and they infect computers installed in protected sites such as medical facilities.  
Malicious code that makes no distinction between lawful and unlawful targets should be 
prohibited.  Military forces already have the obligation to distinguish themselves from 
civilians, one potential method of making military computer systems similarly 
identifiable may be to create universally recognized electronic identifiers to correspond 
with the status of persons and sites under the Geneva Conventions (combatants, medical, 
chaplain, etc.), much as the red cross and red crescent serve as universal visual identifiers 
for medical personnel and sites.  (Brown, 2006)  The use of electronic identifiers and 
visual identifiers are susceptible to abuse.  It’s also safe to assume that the malicious code 
itself can be made smarter, meaning it could be able to identify the likely uses of 
information systems according to the type of software and hardware they contain or by 
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 the type of networks to which they are connected.  For example, U.S. military networks 
generally us the internet extension ".mil," and hard drives containing medical records or 
medical laboratory software are likely to be used by protected facilities. 
Logic bombs can be compared to landmines in that neither can distinguish 
between combatants and noncombatants. Landmines have the legitimate purpose of 
deterring enemy forces from approaching via certain routes. However, abandoned, non-
self-neutralizing mines inflict far greater harm to the civilian population.  The harm is 
both physical, due to accidental injuries and deaths to unwitting victims, and economic, 
in that their presence renders unusable land that could otherwise be used for agriculture 
or industry.  Geneva law prohibits the use of mines and booby traps near concentrations 
of civilians when no ground combat is taking place,   and by requiring their positions be 
recorded or that they be equipped with self-destruction mechanisms that activate when 
they are no longer useful for military purposes.  Logic bombs are similar in that they lie 
dormant in a computer system until they are activated--for example, when certain 
software is run. (Brown, 2006) When activated, logic bombs disable part or all of the 
system 
 3.  Proportionality:  requires that military action not because collateral damage 
which is excessive in light of the expected military advantage. (Brown, 2006) 
 Proportionality in Cyberspace:   
Information warfare as it pertains to proportionality is most evident in the context 
of responding to malicious code and denial-of-service attack.  With today's technology, it 
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 can be difficult if not impossible to trace the source of such an attack if, as most are, the 
attack is carried out clandestinely. As noted by Ruth Wedgwood: 
If . . . [a country] were the victim of an attack on vital computer systems, the 
temptation to respond in kind would be considerable. Yet the ultimate source 
of a computer attack can be acutely difficult to determine--a problem 
magnified by the deliberate use of "looping" or "weaving"--using another's 
server to disguise the origination of the attack. An attack is likely to be sent 
through an unrelated server in order to mask its authorship, and a response in 
kind may end up damaging or disabling the "looped" server. (Wedgwood, 
2002) 
In many cases, ghost computers and zombie systems belong to innocent non 
combatants whose systems or servers have been hi-jacked by malicious code without 
their knowledge or consent.  In this scenario, military forces would have to determine 
whether defensive measures are adequate to defend against the attack: or if a counter-
attack against the attacking server is necessary.  If an attack is needed then military 
leaders would have to decide if the result of an attack against and enemies system is 
worth the outcome or if it would be detrimental to civilian infrastructure. (Brown, 1999)  
Leadership will also have to weigh if a counter attack might be possible to deter a future 
attack. LOAC does not protect noncombatants from being inconvenienced; it protects 
them only from life-threatening conditions caused by the armed conflict.  If innocent 
parties are harmed in the counter-attack, the responsibility for that harm would lie with 
the original attacking party who co-opted the innocent systems in the first place. 
 4.  Chivalry:  requires war to be waged in accordance with widely accepted 
formalities, such as those defiling lawful “ruses” (e.g. camouflage and mock troop 
movements) and unlawful treachery (for example, misusing internationally accepted 
symbols in false surrenders) (Waldrop, 2004) 
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  Chivalry in cyberspace: 
 1. Prohibition of Perfidy 
International law prohibits perfidy, which is defined as an act "inviting the confidence 
of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, 
protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to 
betray that confidence."  One of the classic examples of this act is pretending to surrender 
in order to draw the enemy closer, and then firing on them at close range.  Yes, this 
would give the military surrendering the military advantage, but it is deceptive.  Some 
other common examples are pretending to be wounded, misusing protective emblems 
such as the Red Cross or Red Crescent, and pretending to be a noncombatant or neutral 
status. By using these kings of activities the enemy then believes that certain forces have 
a protected status, and should not be attacked, when in fact they have no protected status 
and are open for attack.  (Brown, 1999) 
Information technology developments have changed and expanded the methods 
and effectiveness of committing perfidy in the areas of imaging, spoofing and 
psychological operations.  For example, images of military bases, could be intercepted 
and morphed to disguise them or make them seem they are located somewhere else.  If a 
military force morphed an image to make it appear that nothing is there would be a 
legitimate and would not be considered perfidy.  However, if an image was morphed to 
make a military base appear to be a protected site, when in fact it is not, would be 
perfidy.  Sending false communications to mislead the enemy into believing that the 
sender's forces are in a different location and in a different strength or that they have a 
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 new intent are permissible.  But, wrongly making the enemy think a target has a protected 
status when it doesn’t or falsely surrendering is perfidity.  (Brown, 1999) 
 2. Perfidy and Malicious Code 
Malicious code is most often propagated by sending e-mail attachments to 
unsuspecting victims.  In order for the malicious code to do its job it must appear 
inconspicuous, otherwise with all the training military members receive on such e-mails 
would cause them to delete it and it would not do as it was intended.  In a sense, this 
violates the requirement that combatants be easily identifiable.  As long as military forces 
take reasonable care to distinguish between combatant and noncombatant targets, then 
information attacks using malicious code would be valid methods of warfare and 
deserving of regulation. 
 3. Morphing 
The principle of chivalry also does not directly speak to morphing images for 
propagandistic purposes, using computers to alter reality.  An example during the Gulf 
War is when the Iraqi officials broadcast pictures to the news media of a mosque with its 
dome missing.  However, what actually happened was the Iraqi forces removed the dome 
in order to make it appear that the U.S. military defaced their mosque.  With the advent of 
new technology morphing is being made easier to fabricate evidence.  Images of military 
forces committing war crimes can be alter to make them look like other forces are 
actually committing the crime.  In the long run these tactics may the war and prolong the 
duration and cause more casualties and distain. (Brown, 1999) 
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 The Outer Space Treaty 
 It was not very long ago when for the thoughts of preserving space for peaceful 
purposes began at the United Nations in the 1950’s.   In 1957 the U.S. and its allies 
submitted their proposals for how the treaty should look for reserving space exclusively 
for “peaceful and scientific purposes,” (Ruseck, 2003) but the Soviet Union rejected all 
proposals based on their preparation to launch the world’s first satellite and in order to 
test its first intercontinental ballistic missile. 
 The UN resolution of 1884 called on countries to refrain from stationing WMDs 
in outer space.  UN resolution 1962 set legal principles on outer space exploration, 
stipulating that all countries have the right to explore space.  In 1963, these two 
resolutions became the framework for the Outer Space Treaty.  The U.S. and the Soviet 
Union submitted two separate proposals in 1966.  After reviewing both, they came up 
with a mutually agreed proposal approved on December 19, 1966 and was signed and 
approved by all parties and entered into force October 10, 1967. (Ruseck, 2003) 
 Basically the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 bans stationing WMDs in outer space, 
spells out the legally binding rules of space exploration, and prohibits military activities 
on celestial bodies.  Ninety-seven countries are part of the treaty; North Korea is the only 
state with real potential for space-launch capabilities that has not signed the treaty.  Many 
countries seem to be concerned with the U.S. missile defense plans and space policy.  
China has proposed a disarmament agreement in Geneva in the hopes to negotiate a treaty 
in order to prevent and arms race in outer space.  The U.S. insists there is no need for the 
treaty, because at this time there is not an arms race for outer space.   
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  The basic treaty terms forbid countries from deploying “nuclear weapons or any 
other kind of weapons of mass destruction” in outer space.  In the treaty the definition of 
WMD is not spelled out, but is to be commonly understood as nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons.    One thing the treaty doesn’t address is the launching of ballistic 
missiles, which could be armed with nuclear warheads through space.  The treaty 
emphasizes that space is to be used for peaceful purposes which could be interpreted as 
all weapons through space. 
The treaty’s key arms control provisions are in Article IV states parties commit 
not to: 
- Place in orbit around the Earth or other celestial bodies any nuclear weapons or  
  objects carrying WMD 
- Install WMD on celestial bodies or station WMD in outer space in any other  
  manner  
- Establish military bases or installations, test “any type of weapons,” or conduct  
   military exercises on the moon and other celestial bodies 
Other treaty provisions underscore that space is no single country’s domain and 
that all countries have a right to explore it. These provisions state that:  
- Space should be accessible to all countries and can be 
- Space and celestial bodies are exempt from national claims of ownership 
- Countries are to avoid contaminating and harming space or celestial bodies  
- Countries exploring space are responsible and liable for damage their activities  
   cause  
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 - Space exploration is to be guided by “principles of cooperation and mutual  
  assistance,” such as obliging astronauts to provide aid to one another if needed  
  (Ruseck, 2003) 
International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT)  
International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) as stated in AMC Instruction 33-
109, International Maritime Satellite Management, is a commercial communication 
System subject to international law and treaty.  It is a radio communication device using a 
satellite link to interface with terrestrial telephone systems or other mobile terminals.  
Terminals are commissioned as land, air or sea terminal.  Once commissioned, the 
terminals may be used only in the configuration stated in the commissioning application.  
 There are 79 countries on the international INMARSAT treaty.  One of the 
provisions of the treaty is that it may only be used for administrative, humanitarian and 
peacetime applications or under the auspices of the United States.  The system may not 
be used for making war or for example it cannot be used to direct air strikes etc. 
 Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and Defense Information 
Technology Contracting Organization (DITCO) consider INMARSAT long-haul 
telecommunications systems per Department of Defense Instruction 46410-14, Base and 
Long-Haul Telecommunications Equipment and Services.   
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 WMD 
As defined by the Department of Defense Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
are weapons that are very capable of high destruction and of being used to destroy a large 
number of people.  WMD are generally seen as high damage causing explosives or 
nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons.   (DTIC, 2008)  
 AF Handbook 10-2502, USAF Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Planning 
and Response handbook, states terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons within 
the United States is a Federal offense under Title 18. U.S. Code (USC) Section 175 for 
biological weapons possession and Section 229 for chemical or biological weapons use as 
a WMD.  Even when conducted overseas, any property owned, leased or used by any US 
agency or department, having a chemical or biological weapons attack is a Federal 
offense, Title 18 USC, Section 229 (4).   
 AF Handbook 10-2502, USAF Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Planning 
and Response handbook, also covers the use of WMD during wartime between nations.  
It sates that the use of chemical or biological weapons from one nation against another 
nation is a clear violation of LOAC.   
 Per DoDD 5100.77, paragraph 5.6, the U.S. Army is the DoD Executive Agent 
for LOAC violation issues and they are responsible for performing investigations 
pertaining to chemical and biological weapons use.  
An analogy can be made of the effects of computer viruses and from those of 
biological and chemical weapons.  These weapons are clearly effective at neutralizing the 
combatant forces against whom they are used.  Though their targets are very specific 
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 their effects are widespread.  Not only are they far reaching but they have the potential to 
kill far more noncombatants than the combatants such was the case with Iraq's use of 
chemical weapons against Iranian forces and Kurdish separatists during the Iran-Iraq 
War. (Brown, 1999)   Biological and chemical weapons also inflict unnecessary 
suffering.  Bullets and shrapnel injure more than they kill, they tend to have the same 
effect without resulting in as many deaths.  Biological and chemical weapons kill far 
more often than they injure, and they have more long-term effects, such as blister agents, 
far more painful than any long-term injuries caused by conventional weapons.  Use of 
such weapons violates the rule of proportionality, in that it causes collateral damage and 
seen as an excessive use of force.   
In today’s world there are not to many transactions that occur that do not involve 
some type of technology, from transportation, to home computers, electricity, financial 
institutions and the media to name a few.  From living room hackers to terrorist threats 
attacks are being carried out daily through technology.  As defined above WMD are 
weapons that when used are capable of killing a mass amount of people, it doesn’t give a 
specific number.  What is mass destruction?  For example, what if a terrorist was able to 
hack into a power grid on the east coast and take out an entire grid.  This would mean no 
electricity for food, air conditioning, heat, transportation, and medical for millions of 
people, to name a few.  If this were to happen, depending on how long the power was to 
be turned off then it may kill and injure hundreds and thousands of people.  Or what if a 
hacker was able to take control of a major dam?  If they were able to open the dam and 
release the water, depending on what dam it is, it could kill hundreds of thousands of 
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 people.  Both of these examples can easily seen as a WMD and currently it really is not 
addressed in any LOAC or international laws.    
Content Analysis  
 As outlined in chapter 1, the purpose of this research is to determine what 
constitutes and act of war in cyberspace.  For the purpose of this research an analysis was 
conducted to determine what laws were involved and how they translate to cyber war as 
they are written.   
 The results of the content analysis from the textual data, are presented in 
frequency table below.  The table depicts the theme name, number of relevant articles, 
number of document the theme appeared and the frequency effect.  This methodology 
allowed for the possibility of identifying more than one theme within a single source.   
 
 
Table 1.  Seven Themes 
 
Theme 
No. Theme Name 
No. 
Relevant 
Articles 
Documents 
containing Theme 
Frequency 
Effect 
1 LOAC 33 25 75.7% 
2 Hacker Attack 33 16 48.4% 
3 United Nations Charter 33 11 33.30% 
4 Attribution 33 5 15.20% 
5 Outer Space treaty 33 4 12.10% 
6 
Weapons of Mass 
Destruction 33 4 12.10% 
7 
Offensive/Defensive 
Measures 33 2 .06%  
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 Theme 1: Hacker Attack 
 Theme 1 was the highest calculated Frequency Effect Size of 48.4%, and it was 
hacker based attacks. The majority of the articles researched saw an immediate need to 
determine what action should be taken against hackers that are a threat to a nation’s 
security.  There are several different scenarios to discuss in this domain.  Most of the 
articles discussed hackers of the citizen nature that were acting on their own behave.  For 
instance if a lone citizen decided to hack into a DoD computer system.  If DoD was able 
to back hack and find the source of the attack they could prosecute the hacker based on 
the U.S. legal system.  However, what would be the consequence if a hacker from 
another country took over several zombie computers around the world and had all attack 
our DoD systems on a given day?  It would be almost impossible to track the attack back 
to just one computer system.  If DoD would be able to track the attack back to a specific 
computer to a specific person then, would DoD would have the right to attack them back, 
and then would their systems be seen as weapons?  What if they were military personnel 
or government workers would this is different if they were civilian?  In the Estonia case if 
they would have been able to track the attack back to a specific person’s computer system 
then per the law they would have had to ask for the governing nation to take action 
against the person.  The U.S. could ask for extradition of the attacker so they could have a 
trial and punish them, but unless the U.S. has an extradition treaty with the country where 
it occurred it would not be granted.   
The data concludes that the subject of “hacker” based attacks needs to be 
addressed through international laws.  As described in the article by Wingfield, since 
nation states and non-state actors now have the capacity to use relatively inexpensive and 
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 widely available hardware, software, and expertise to launch “attacks” against their targets 
the rules that govern them need to be updated.    This is a very difficult task since technology 
is advancing so rapidly and the capabilities of the hackers grow exponentially with the 
technology, and they share information so rapidly and inexpensively.    
Theme 2:  LOAC 
 Theme 2 was the second highest calculated Frequency Effect Size of 48.4%, and 
it pertains to LOAC.  The majority of the articles researched determined current LOAC 
loosely translate to cyber war.  However, many of the authors of the researched articles 
believed a more serious look needs to be taken at how they pertain to cyber war.  To date, 
the rules and laws of war have primarily been concerned with sovereign borders and 
physical invasion of those borders by armed belligerents. (DiCenso, 1999)  However, in 
cyberspace there are no borders.  Research shows nations are not worried about physical 
weapons and someone else physically stepping on our soil.  Research shows how nations 
think about information warfare and cyberspace is that they are the new battleground and 
the terrain of network connections, both owned by military and civilians that interact 
without regard to lines on a map.  The threat comes from the young, the older, techies and 
not so techies who may be able to disable banking systems, electrical grids, airline traffic 
control systems, and communications equipment.   
Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 51-4 (1994), Compliance with the Law of 
Armed Conflict, par. 2, requires Air Force personnel to comply with the rules “during 
armed conflict.”  This directive defines “armed conflict”
 
as a situation where at least one 
state has begun to use armed force.  However, there is no guidance on what constitutes 
“armed force,” obviously it means that one must utilize a physical weapon of some type.  
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 Even with the advent of information warfare and the push to define war in the 
information age this directive has not been updated to clarify.  Better yet, Air Force 
Instruction (AFI) 51-402, Weapons Review, May 1994, states computer systems would 
probably not be considered weapon. It states, “Weapons are devices designed to kill, 
injure, or disable people, or to damage or destroy property.  And this instruction states 
that weapons do not include . . . electronic warfare devices. (AFI 51-402)  Even thought 
computers as not seen as physical weapons, they should definitely be seen as a weapon 
that could do substantial damage to an enemy’s war-fighting capability.   
As history shows us, LOAC morphs to encompass the ever changing way war is 
fought.  However, with the emergence of cyberspace and how electronic warfare is 
conducted, it is not surprising that the LOAC has not kept up with the information age.  
During World War I, aerial war fare hadn’t existed; principles had to be developed from 
the existing rules.  Only after seeing the results of applying land warfare rules to bombing 
did LOAC change.  As the data showed LOAC adapted to new war fighting techniques, 
as capabilities of other nations to use cyberspace and information warfare to conduct war, 
LOAC will evolve along with new technology.  As the researched demonstrated with the 
computer attack on Estonia’s parliament, computers can cause damage to a nation and its 
government.  In this scenario Estonia claimed that Russia was angry with Estonia’s 
government for moving a Soviet-era war memorial. (Hollis, 2007)  They were correct, 
they were able to trace the attack and arrest the culprit. (Fox News, 2008) Even though 
the attacker did give a direct hit to Estonia’s parliament, nobody was physically hurt, and 
the computer systems were returned to normal…was this an act of war?  Currently, there 
50 
 is no authority to suggest that a computer is a weapon or that an information operation act 
is an “act of war.”  However, if death and destruction would have resulted from this 
attack, an armed response by the victim nation would probably be warranted.   
 Based on the research the majority of the authors agree that LOAC needs to be 
revised.  Currently, in armed conflict there exists rules pertaining to POW camps, 
hospitals, chapels and the Red Cross.  However, during cyber war if a virus is sent out via 
the internet it doesn’t denote between combatants and non combatants nor is it able to 
distinguish between a hospital network and a military network.  Another, subject area that 
needs to be visited when discussing LOAC, is when does cyber war allow for “use of 
force” in retaliation?  Much of the data in this research addressed this issue and all agree 
that leadership needs to address the subject.  A foundation or an outline to follow in order 
to address attacks with the correct force applicable to the crime needs to be established.   
Theme 3: United Nations Charter 
 Theme 3 the next highest calculated Frequency Effect Size of 33.3%, and it 
pertains to the United Nations Charter.  The many of the articles researched felt the 
United Nations Charter was in need of revision.  As discussed in this research, LOAC 
authorizes a nation engaged in armed conflict with another nation to attack lawful 
military targets belonging to the enemy.  However, what if a nation is in a peacetime state 
and has a cyber attack launched on it from another country?   
Article 42 of the United Nations Charter allows such action to be taken by air, 
sea, or land forces that may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Some examples noted in the research for this article were demonstrations, 
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 blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United 
Nations.  No requirements exist that a “threat to peace” needs to be an attack in the form 
of an armed attack, a use of force, or any other condition specified in the charter.  The 
Security Council has the authority to decide what constitutes a “threat to peace” and what 
sort of response is acceptable.  (DoD/GC, 1999)  Therefore, nothing would prevent the 
Council from finding that a computer network attack was a “threat to the peace” if it 
determined that the attack warranted retaliation.  However, many of the authors felt the 
United Nations would not get involved unless a cyber attack were to cause widespread 
damage to economics or loss of life of a country. 
Article 51, requires an “armed attack.”  Traditionally, this means with physical 
weapons.  However, what if the attacks a cyber attack?  (DoD/GC, 1999) 
Much of the research discussed the United Nations Charter and determined it was 
out of touch with today’s information warfare and cyber attacks.  Unlike traditional war, 
cyber war is not just physical and it can affect the economy, financial institutions, 
transportation, during peacetime setting.   
Theme 4:  Attribution 
 Theme 4 had a Frequency Effect Size of 15.2%, and it pertains to the attribution 
of a cyber attack.  Once common theme among all the articles detailing cyber attacks was 
how to attribute where the attack came from and who was conducting it.  Just as in the 
Estonia parliament attack mentioned in this research they were able to track the attack 
back to the Kremlin.  However, they were not able to determine who launched the attack 
or if the attack was actually launched from within the Kremlin or if that particular 
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 computer was nothing more than a zombie computer.  Even though this attack was 
successful and caused a disruption of parliament, no one was charged with a crime.  
Another implication would be whether the attacker was a combatant or a noncombatant 
and if they were acting on their own will or for a nation. 
 All authors recommend attribution be reviewed and devise a plan for which 
nations can work together to target, capture and extradite persons responsible for cyber 
attacks…if it’s possible to track them.   
Theme 5:  Outer space Treaty 
 Theme 5 had a Frequency Effect Size of 12.1%, and it pertains to The Outer 
Space Treaty.  The Outer Space Treaty indicates that parties agree “not to place in orbit 
around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of 
mass destruction.  The basic treaty forbids countries from deploying “nuclear weapons” 
or any other kind of WMD in outer space.  In the treaty the definition of WMD is not 
spelled out, but is to be commonly understood as nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons.  One thing the treaty doesn’t address is the launching of ballistic missiles, 
which could be armed with nuclear warheads through space.  The treaty emphasizes that 
space is to be used for peaceful purposes which could be interpreted as all weapons 
through space.  The treaty does not differentiate between cyberspace and outer space.  
Space law was created to resolve issues around spacecraft or the use of celestial bodies.  
It will not help resolve any issues the U.S. currently face in negotiating the legal 
landscape or cyberspace.  (DiCenso, 1999) 
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 International Maritime Satellite Management is a commercial communications 
System subject to international law and treaty.  It is a radio communication device using a 
satellite link to interface with terrestrial telephone systems or other mobile terminals.  
The terminals are commissioned as land, air or sea terminal.  Once commissioned, the 
terminals may be used only in the configuration stated in the commissioning application.  
One of the provisions of the treaty is that it may only be used for administrative, 
humanitarian and peacetime applications or under the auspices of the United States.  The 
system may not be used for making war or for example it cannot be used to direct air 
strikes etc. 
 Neither of The Outer Space Treaty nor the INMARSAT addresses their use in 
cyberspace and cyber war.  The treaties state that both are to be used in peace and not to 
be used as an advantage during wartime.  However, what if a cyber attack occurred and 
the combatants were able to use the satellite to there advantage by tuning it off and 
flipping it back on or if they just completely shut it down?  Like the researchers at the 
Department of Energy’s Idaho National Laboratory generator that they were able to make 
it self-destruct using computer attacks. (Hollis, 2007).  Is it also possible to make a 
satellite self-destruct with similar attacks? 
 Again, the consensus is that these treaties are out dated and need to be revisited 
and re-written to include cyber warfare.   
Theme 6:  WMD 
Theme 6 had a Frequency Effect Size of 12.1%, and it pertains to Weapons of 
Mass Destruction.  The data concluded that WMDs are understood to be nuclear, 
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 chemical and biological.  In March 2007, researchers at the Department of Energy’s 
Idaho National Laboratory conducted an experimental cyber attack and managed to make 
a generator self-destruct. (Hollis, 2007)  Computer attacks don’t just threaten other 
computers but the larger infrastructure that controls vital resources.  Viruses could 
become as dangerous as missiles.  At the same time, cyber attacks offer militaries the 
option of disabling an enemy’s vital infrastructure temporarily or completely destroying 
it.  If the Department of Energy was able to cause a generator to self-destruct then would 
an attack on the Eastern sea board power grid be a WMD?  If a dam were to be attacked a 
let out its water and it flood a city is that considered a WMD?    
All the research for this paper that pertained to WMD agreed that this is a subject 
that needs to be revisited.  It needs to be understood what is considered a WMD in 
cyberspace.  All authors agree that traditional thinking of this subject needs to disappear 
and the blinders need to come off and reevaluate the situation. 
Theme 7:  Offensive/Defensive Measures 
Theme 7 had a Frequency Effect Size of .06%, and it pertains to Offensive and 
Defensive Measures.  Based on the research offensive and defensive measures are on the 
radar.  Many of the defensive measures discussed in the data was concerning keeping our 
adversaries from having a successful attack.  Our DoD networks are constantly being 
probed trying to find a week point for access.  Our defensive measures are tested 
everyday, and the U.S. can never drop our guard. 
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 The offensive measures the research discussed pertained to keeping our 
adversaries in the dark.  The U.S. military has been basically coming up with ways in 
order to change the data to make it seem like military installations are not there.  Both the 
defensive and the offensive measures will be beneficial for future wars.  If the U.S. 
military is able to counter their attacks and keep them from gaining access to our troop 
movement, supplies etc., then the U.S. military would have the upper hand.  Offensive 
measures are more useful in war.  By fighting offensively, the U.S. stays a step ahead of 
their opponents by anticipating their next move or by leading them in a different 
direction.  The U.S. military needs to be vigilant in developing these measures and ensure 
the U.S. stays in keeping with LOAC. 
Conclusion 
  To conclude this chapter, my research gives relevant examples and instances of 
what could happen in cyberspace, how it can be translated into LOAC and international 
law as it they are written today.  All the services, DoD, Homeland Security and civilian 
institutions are all starting to address the issue of cyberspace and comprehend the 
implications on our national defense if the U.S. doesn’t address it now.  But, the research 
did not find proposals for new LOAC, international laws and treaties.   The research has 
shown that there are serious implications of a cyber attack and the current laws are not 
coving what to do if an attack does cause wide spread death and casualties.  Some 
countries do have criminal laws in effect for computer fraud, sabotage and defacement of 
websites, but there are no laws expanding on attacks between nations and what “use of 
force” is interpreted as in cyberspace.  Not only do laws in the U.S. need to be revisited 
56 
 in terms of cyber war, but international laws and treaties to be addressed and how cyber 
war translates to them.  If the left hand is not talking to the right, then there are always 
opportunities for attacks to occur and be successful.  Not only is our nation’s safety at 
stake, but the whole world revolves around technology and relies on it everyday.  The 
right attack would be able to cripple not just one nation, but several around the world.   
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 V. Conclusion 
Conclusion 
 The goals of this research effort was to look at laws of armed conflict, 
international laws and treaties of war and how traditional laws translate to cyberspace in 
order to answer my thesis question: What constitutes an Act of War in Cyberspace? 
Based on all the data for this research there is no definitive answer to this question.  The 
data used for my research all gave exceptional examples and scenarios of what could 
happen and what would be justified as a cyber war.  But, nowhere in the data was a 
generally accepted definition of cyber war and what is considered an “act of war” in 
cyberspace? The laws have not kept up with technology and the advancement of the 
individuals launching the attacks.  It is obvious that over the decades the way the U.S. 
communicates and fights has changed drastically.  Terms such as IW and cyberspace are 
not even dialog in any current international laws and treaties.  The research showed the 
way war is fought has changed from bullets and missiles to bits and bytes and therefore 
the governing laws and treaties pertaining to conventional warfare needs to be changed.  
It is a fact that our nations critical infrastructure consists of the physical and cyber assets 
owned and operated by public and private companies that control our critical support 
structures (i.e. agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, 
defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, 
banking and finance, chemicals and hazardous material and postal and shipping to name a 
few).  Thus, cyberspace is the nervous system of our country.  Our national security is 
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 dependent upon our leadership’s ability to get a grip on cyberspace and what it means to 
secure it. 
The U.S. is at the forefront of the battleground of cyberspace and the initial lead 
on getting a grip on cyber war.  Each service has a “cyber” shop; DoD and Homeland 
Security each have a division dedicated to cyber war fare.  Research shows the U.S. 
needs to have a national strategy and define how the U.S. will react to cyber attacks.  
Proportionality needs to be included to state when does a cyber attack constitute a 
physical attack?  For instance if a WMD were to be dropped on the stock market and 
cause death and destruction and economic turmoil, the U.S. military would have the 
authority to defend ourselves and react with physical force.  Therefore, if a cyber attack 
was launched and it was able to open up a dam and cause hundreds or thousands of 
deaths and injuries, causing essentially the same damage...would it also be a WMD?  
Would the U.S. military have the authority to react with physical force when the initial 
attack itself was not physical, but cyber?  The U.S. and our allies, need to be able to 
answer when is it ok to act based on “use of force” and “self defense” in cyberspace.   
These laws need to incorporate contractors, privately owned networks and civilian 
institutions into the equation.  Almost all of our critical infrastructures is supported by or 
owned by privately owned companies.  Contractors are an important part of our daily 
mission and they are critical to our national security, our military needs them to aid in the 
fight and ensure the security of our national assets.    
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 Once the U.S has a national overview and sight picture, then the U.S. needs to 
encourage and enlist the help of its allies in a re-write of current international laws of war 
with the U.N. Council.  Just as LOAC, the Geneva Convention, Hague all give a template 
for how militaries conduct themselves in physical war, militaries need to have the same 
template that conveys to cyber war.  Therefore, based on my research there is no 
definitive answer as to what constitutes an act of war in cyberspace.  The data did not 
define or pin point an action or a trigger that would translate to all situations.  The 
concept of cyber war is so new and there are so many moving parts and players it makes 
it difficult to imagine all scenarios and how they should play out in war.  The data in this 
research concluded that cyber war is real and on the minds of many leaders.  It is being 
taken more seriously and steps are being taken to get a grasp on what needs to be the next 
step.  With the standup of the AFCYBER Command, the USAF will see changes in how 
cyber war is viewed in the near future. 
Recommendations 
 Throughout this research more questions were asked than were answered. Based 
on this research and the lack of a definition for cyber war and no concrete rules of 
engagement in cyberspace, it is recommended that the leadership of all nations in the 
U.N. need to address all international laws governing cyber war.  To start, a universal 
definition of cyber war needs to be established.  In addition, all laws conveying to 
traditional war (i.e. LOAC, WMD, U.N. Charter, attribution, etc.) need to be revised 
and/or re-written to incorporate cyber war and cyberspace.  The ramifications if 
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 cyberspace is not address in these international laws are endless.  If these laws are not re-
written it is giving hackers free rein to launch attacks against whomever and whenever 
they like.  Today, the DoD computers and computers of other national governments are 
being probed daily, sometimes thousands of times a day.  One reason for this is the U.S. 
is the best military in the world, thus causing other countries to find new avenues in order 
to compete with the U.S. military.  In cyberspace countries are able to compete for the 
fraction of the cost since no military or expensive machinery is needed.   In cyberspace 
the battleground is the same for every player and currently there are no international laws 
pertaining to cyberspace.  However, more nations are incorporating computer laws into 
their criminal laws and as in the Estonia case they are able to prosecute criminally if they 
are able to prove who launched an attack. 
Cyberspace is such a vast entity and new concept it is impossible to include 
everything into one thesis.  The following paragraphs provide some topic areas for future 
research in areas related to the identification of cyber war and what constitutes and act of 
war in cyberspace. 
Define cyber war.  This definition is key to incorporating cyber war into the 
revision of international laws.  Without a universal definition these laws will not be able 
to be revised or re-written.  
 When does cyber war engage in physical war?  Many of the articles for this 
research indicated that there needs to be a determining factor for when cyber war turns 
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 into physical war.  Currently, there are no clear definitions of when this should occur or 
what would justify a physical attack. 
 What are the attributions of cyber war?  What actions of cyber attack should be 
reacted upon?  If the U.S. was attacked by a denial of service attack and the source can 
not be determine, then when is a counter denial of service attack feasible?  
 Weapons of Mass Destruction.  When is a cyber attack considered a weapon of 
mass destruction?  What should the criteria be for defining a cyber attack as an act of war 
and how does the U.S. update current international laws and treaties to reflect that? 
 Jurisdiction and Information Warfare Investigation.  The information 
requirements analysis method developed in this research could be used to construct new 
laws used to back hack attacks to what criminal laws may apply to the attacker.  If it is 
possible to identify the host nation and define who may cross international boards for 
intelligence collection the U.S. may have a better chance at actually capturing the 
attacker. 
 Cyber Battle Plan.  Due to the newness and lack of international laws pertaining 
to cyber war a type of cyber battle plan would be helpful.  The U.S. needs some type of 
plan that gives different scenarios and what legally the U.S. can do based on the type of 
attack received.   
 Offensive and Defensive Cyber Operations.  Offensive Counter cyber (OCC) 
operations deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, or deceive an adversary’s cyber capability.  
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 OCC targets include adversary terrestrial, airborne, and space networks; electronic attack 
(EA) and network attack (NetA) systems; and, command, control, communication, 
computers, and intelligence (C4I) nodes. As an adversary becomes more dependent on 
cyberspace, OCC operations have the potential to produce effects that hinder their ability 
to effectively organize, coordinate, and orchestrate a military campaign.  
 Defensive Counter cyber (DCC) is to protect friendly forces and vital interests 
from adversary cyber attack.  DCC consists of active and passive cyber defense 
operations including all defensive measures designed to destroy attacking adversary 
forces or reduce their effectiveness. Cyber defense includes measures to preserve, protect, 
recover, and reconstitute friendly cyber capabilities before, during, and after an adversary 
attack.  
 Offensive and Defensive cyber attacks will need to be researched further in order 
to understand the scope of cyber war and assist in the writing of cyber laws. 
Summary 
 This research presents a method for identifying what constitutes and act of war in 
cyberspace.  Chapter I presented and overview of the research and background 
information to cyber war. 
 Chapter II provided background information that enables the reader to understand 
key research concepts related to the complexity of identifying cyber war and what 
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 actually constitutes an act of war.  In this chapter LOAC, the Geneva Convention, WMD 
and The Outer Space Treaty were covered.   
 Chapter III presented the methodology used in this research.  For the purpose of 
this research a literature review was conducted and content analysis of cyber war and 
how it pertains to the way militaries traditionally declared war, how cyberspace fits into 
the constraint of war today, Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Outer Space Treaty and 
INMARSAT.  In order to do this a literature review of cyberspace in military doctrine, 
Air Force cyberspace doctrine, LOAC, and international laws, WMD, The Outer Space 
Treaty and the INMARSAT treaty was conducted. Then a content analysis of the data 
was conducted by a themed approach by coding and comparing the textual information 
and displaying it in frequency tables. 
 Chapter IV applies the methodology from Chapter III and gave an analysis of the 
literature review and a content analysis.  The content analysis was conducted by a themed 
approach by coding and comparing the textual information and displaying the common 
themes in frequency tables. 
 Chapter V provides conclusions from this research and suggests potential areas 
for future research related to the identification of what constitutes an act of war in 
cyberspace. 
  
 
64 
 65 
Appendix A:  Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 
 
8TH CC – Air Force Core Concept Plan 
AFCYBER - Air Force Cyberspace Command  
AFI – Air Force Instruction 
AFPD – Air Force Policy Directive 
AMC – Air Mobility Command 
C4I - Computers and Intelligence  
DCC – Defensive Counter Cyber 
DISA - Defense Information Systems Agency   
DITCO - Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization  
DoD – Department of Defense 
EA - Electronic Attack  
INMARSAT - International Maritime Satellite 
LOAC – Law of Armed Conflict 
NetA - network attack  
OCC - Offensive Counter Cyber 
U.N. – United Nations 
WMD – Weapon of Mass Destruction 
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